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Introduction
Current approaches to network defence are limited in 
scale and speed by the limited availability of skilled hu-
man  operators  and  the  inability  of  these  operators  to 
share information and work at cyberspeeds. We believe 
that network defence can be scaled out and enhanced 
through  timely  sharing  of  relevant  information  about 
common threats that are reasonably expected to affect 
a host in the near term. The goal is for critical informa-
tion about relevant threats to be shared rapidly enough 
that the information is useful to a recipient in preparing 
a  timely  defence  that  adapts  to  current  threat  condi-
tions.  Unfortunately,  in  current  practice,  such  timely 
and relevant sharing does not typically occur. 
Current approaches to sharing threat information make 
use of Internet-wide threat feeds that are commercially 
available. Such feeds typically propagate threat inform-
ation  with  delays  on  the  order  of  minutes  to  hours, 
though  Microsoft’s  Cyber  Threat  Intelligence  Program 
under  Windows  Azure  promises  updates  as  often  as 
every 30 seconds (tinyurl.com/mslnv2h). In contrast, the at-
tacks being reported may move from one host to anoth-
er in milliseconds. In addition, commercial threat feeds 
report on a wide variety of threats, requiring that con-
sumers  filter  and  prioritize  threat  information  before 
acting on it. Thus, a rapid, autonomous improvement 
in  defensive  posture  against  imminent  threats  is  cur-
rently  prevented  both  by  delay  in  the  availability  of 
threat  information  and  by  delays  due  to  the  filtering 
and prioritizing of that information. 
In this article, we articulate a novel design pattern for 
defensive  cyberwarfare:  enclaves  of  cooperating  hosts 
that use autonomous, timely, peer-to-peer sharing and 
exploitation  of  relevant  threat  information  to  solve 
these (and other) network defence problems. We begin 
Information about cyberthreats within networks spreads slowly relative to the speed at 
which those threats spread. Typical "threat feeds" that are commercially available also dis-
seminate information slowly relative to the propagation speed of attacks, and they often 
convey irrelevant information about imminent threats. As a result, hosts sharing a network 
may miss opportunities to improve their defence postures against imminent attack be-
cause needed information arrives too late or is lost in irrelevant noise. We envision timely, 
relevant peer-to-peer sharing of threat information – based on current technologies – as a 
solution to these problems and as a useful design pattern for defensive cyberwarfare. In 
our setting, network nodes form communities that we call enclaves, where each node de-
fends itself while sharing information on imminent threats with peers that have similar 
threat exposure. In this article, we present our vision for this solution. We sketch the archi-
tecture of a typical node in such a network and how it might interact with a framework for 
sharing threat information; we explain why certain defensive countermeasures may work 
better in our setting; we discuss current tools that could be used as components in our vis-
ion; and we describe opportunities for future research and development.
If we were sincerely looking for a place of safety, 
for  real  security  and  success,  then  we  would 
begin to turn to our communities.
Wendell Barry
Author, critic, and farmer
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with an overview of our approach and its benefits, and 
follow  with  a  description  of  current  technologies  that 
suggest  our  approach  is  viable.  Finally,  we  call  on  the 
network-defence research and development community 
to improve upon and realize this vision in practice. 
Proposed Approach 
Enclaves  can  be  small  or  large,  and  both  intra-  and 
inter-organizational. Individual sub-nets may form en-
claves, as may corporations with similar threat profiles. 
Key  aspects  of  these  enclaves  are  that  they  are  opt-in 
and peer-to-peer. Thus, nodes may dynamically change 
their enclave membership (and thus the threat informa-
tion they receive) to get best data possible. Because en-
claves are peer organizations, no central clearing-house 
serves as a single point of failure for an enclave. Once 
threat information is shared, peer hosts can use it to im-
prove their defensive posture. In the short term, a de-
fensive  response  might  involve  the  application  of 
simple rules. For example, if a threat against a particu-
lar piece of software is detected, instances of that soft-
ware  can  be  taken  offline  or  more  intensive  defences 
can be deployed around it. In the longer term, defensive 
responses might attempt to infer the intent of adversar-
ies or take more nuanced action. To operate in such an 
enclave, hosts must be able to detect threats, commu-
nicate  those  threats,  authenticate  threat  data  received 
from peers, and make use of that authenticated inform-
ation. In this section, we describe our approach to shar-
ing  threat  information  within  enclaves  and  how  it 
achieves these goals.
A notional architecture of a peer agent in such an en-
clave is shown in Figure 1. The core of the peer agent is 
the Inference Engine shown at centre. This engine re-
ceives threat information from local network and host 
intrusion-detection systems (HIDS and NIDS, shown at 
left  in  the  figure).  Threat  information  may  also  be 
provided  by  additional  information-gathering  systems, 
such as the Chaff Controller, shown at bottom, which 
creates  virtual  machines  on  the  local  network  to  con-
fuse  attackers  and  gather  information  about  their  at-
tacks.  We  explain  more  about  network  chaff  in  the 
section on countermeasures. The Inference Engine uses 
this information to control local-host countermeasures 
such as account restrictions or file backup, network-ad-
apter countermeasures such as obscuration of the local-
host network signature, and other mechanisms such as 
network chaff generation. As part of its work, the Infer-
ence Engine sanitizes locally gathered threat data and 
passes it to a publishing agent (part of the Pub/Sub ad-
apter), along with contextual information that may help 
peers to make sense of the threat. In turn, the publisher 
sends  this  threat  information  to  peers  in  the  enclave. 
Subscribed threat data from other peers is received at 
the  network  adapter  (top)  and  processed  by  the  sub-
scribing  agent  (also  in  the  Pub/Sub  adapter),  and  fi-
nally,  the  data  is  sent  to  the  Inference  Engine  for 
interpretation and use.
Our notional peer agent is autonomous; it operates in-
dependently  of  human  administrators  and  centralized 
server control. We propose autonomy because of the in-
creasing disparity between the size of modern networks 
(and the frequency of attacks) compared to the number 
of  trained  human  network  analysts  available  for  net-
work  defence  (Fung,  2013;  tinyurl.com/bc7nb6l).  In  addi-
tion,  typical  network-wide  threats  are  capable  of 
propagating faster than humans can respond (Moore et 
al., 2003;  tinyurl.com/koweuj5). Thus, autonomous defens-
ive operational elements that can be deployed in high 
volume, that make limited decisions, and that react at 
“cyberspeed”,  are  critical  components  in  network  de-
fence. 
Figure 1. Notional architecture of a peer agent in a 
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Central to our approach is the timely sharing of threat 
information among hosts. There is a significant preval-
ence of cyberattacks in which hosts sharing a network 
or other resource are subject to the same attack in rapid 
succession. This prevalence may result from a frequent 
structural  choice  in  the  current  Internet,  where  sub-
nets  tend  to  contain  hosts  running  similar  operating 
systems  with  similar  application  loads  (Chen  et  al., 
2003:  tinyurl.com/kw56ckh;  Abu  Rajab  et  al.,  2005:  tinyurl
.com/l5yvzem). As adoption of IPv6 continues to expand, 
these problems may get worse because system adminis-
trators  organize  their  machines  into  logical  sub-nets 
that are globally addressable. A variety of advanced per-
sistent threats (APTs) typify this iterative attack pattern. 
Hutchins  and  colleagues  (2011;  tinyurl.com/8qhsj5u)  note 
that,  “APT  actors,  by  their  nature,  attempt  intrusion 
after  intrusion.”  For  example,  RSA  Security's  well-
known  network  breach  in  2011  (tinyurl.com/mvk2yjh), 
which started with a phishing campaign targeting two 
groups  of  employees,  subsequently  targeted  many 
hosts on the RSA corporate network. Similar behaviour 
is  seen  in  attacks  that  affect  multiple  networks  that 
share characteristics of interest to an attacker. For ex-
ample,  Operation  Aurora  attacked  several  technology 
and  defence  corporations  in  2009  (tinyurl.com/np89339), 
methodically  exploiting  the  software  configuration 
management  subsystems  on  hosts  throughout  target 
networks. The literature shows that rapid sharing of in-
formation about such threats can be an effective ena-
bler  of  improved  defensive  posture.  For  example, 
Weaver, Staniford, and Paxson (2004; tinyurl.com/kaxwhu3) 
show that defence against scanning worms can be im-
proved by rapid communication of threat information 
among autonomous defensive elements. 
Enclaves use a peer-to-peer paradigm rather than a cli-
ent-server approach for sharing threat information. By 
peer-to-peer  sharing,  we  mean  sharing  performed 
autonomously by participating hosts, thereby avoiding 
human  intervention  or  use  of  a  central  network  re-
source.  Our  motivation  for  this  choice  is  that  central-
ized  resources  such  as  server-deployed  enterprise 
applications are attractive targets for attack (tinyurl.com/
q6xyuhw), and security applications are especially attract-
ive  targets  (tinyurl.com/m7zk9dn).  In  addition,  the  client-
server approach requires an explicit build-out of server 
resources as well as investment in system administra-
tion effort, while peer-to-peer resources scale naturally 
as new peers are added, and they require no central sys-
tem-administration  resources.  In  addition,  peer-to-
peer  architectures  are  more  robust  than  client-server 
architectures due to lack of single points of failure (Lua 
et al., 2005;  tinyurl.com/kygjjen). Conversely, peer-to-peer 
systems  have  inherent  security  weaknesses,  because 
each  peer  is  controlled  by  the  host  on  which  it  runs. 
Thus, “bad actors” – peers providing irrelevant or dis-
tracting threat information to peers in an enclave – can 
adversely affect peer-to-peer networks more easily than 
client-server arrangements. We recognize that our pro-
posal  of  a  peer-to-peer  approach  requires  care  in  au-
thenticating  and  trusting  peers,  and  we  address  this 
problem in the next section.
Our approach limits timely sharing to threat informa-
tion that is likely to be immediately relevant to peers, 
because we expect the reasoning capability in autonom-
ous cyberdefence elements to be limited.  Our goal is 
that  shared  information  should  be  actionable  without 
substantial  filtering,  interpretation,  or  prioritization. 
For example, if a threat manifests a port scan, relevant 
information  shared  among  peers  might  specify  the 
ports scanned, the operating system and version of the 
attacked  host,  and  the  applications  installed  at  the 
scanned ports on that host. A peer host might exploit 
this information for example by applying simple rules 
to block the reported ports for a specified time period if 
the host was running the same operating system as re-
ported.
Component Technologies for Peer Agents
In this section, we break down our envisioned system 
into  five  concrete,  manageable  components:  a  detec-
tion  system,  a  communication  language,  opt-in  com-
munication  channels,  secure  authentication  and  trust 
mechanisms,  and  dynamic  countermeasures.  In  each 
subsection,  we  describe  the  existing  technologies  that 
may begin to meet the needs of these components.
Detection
We  expect  enclaves  to  leverage  existing  host  and  net-
work-intrusion-detection  systems,  as  shown  in  Figure 
1.  Host  Intrusion-Detection  Systems  (HIDSs)  look  for 
internal  changes  to  a  system;  examples  include  Trip-
wire (tinyurl.com/d4pty), which monitors file changes, and 
OSSEC (ossec.net), which checks system logs and regis-
tries, and looks for rootkits. More traditional anti-virus 
tools,  such  as  Norton  Internet  Security  (tinyurl.com/
23shn7p), also may be considered in the HIDS category. 
Network Intrusion-Detection Systems (NIDSs) such as 
Snort (snort.org) detect bad behaviour by sniffing packets 
on attached networks. Other technologies such as fire-
walls  may  also  detect  and  report  threats  in  a  timely 
way. Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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Communication language
Communicating  threat  information  among  peers  re-
quires that both sender and receiver use the same lan-
guage.  The  semantics  of  such  a  language  can  be 
captured in one or more ontologies, whereas syntax can 
be captured in a language specification. An ontology in 
this context is a machine-usable specification of the en-
tities,  concepts,  and  relationships  in  a  domain  of  dis-
course.  Orbst,  Chase,  and  Markeloff  (2012;  tinyurl.com/
kbrrhrf) describe the development of ontologies for cy-
bersecurity at the MITRE Corporation (mitre.org) as part 
of  an  effort  called  Structured  Threat  Information
eXpression  (Barnum,  2013;  tinyurl.com/kdov4c8).  Assured 
Information Security (ainfosec.com) is developing an on-
tology for describing malware behaviour and cyberen-
vironments  (Taylor and Hall, 2013; tinyurl.com/m5yplkz). 
Communication channels
The  channel  for  transmitting  timely,  relevant  cyber-
threat  information  must  be:  decentralized,  to  make  it 
difficult to attack and more robust than a single point of 
failure; reliable, to ensure that threat information is de-
livered; timely, to enable peers to react at cyberspeed; 
and efficient, to minimize impact to normal business lo-
gic. Publish-subscribe middleware, such as implement-
ations  of  the  Data  Distribution  Service  (DDS; 
portals.omg.org/dds/), are designed with such properties in 
mind, and thus may be suitable choices for communic-
ation  among  enclave  members.  DDS  family  members 
are fully distributed without need for brokering of medi-
ation  between  publishers  and  subscribers.  Reliability 
and timeliness have been demonstrated in several DDS 
implementations  such  as  OpenSplice  Community 
(tinyurl.com/p8pw24g) and OpenDDS (opendds.org). 
At least one communication channel is in development 
specifically  for  transport  of  cyberthreat  information: 
the TAXII sharing service (taxii.mitre.org) being developed 
in  conjunction  with  MITRE’s  STIX  language.  DDS  or 
TAXII  are  existing  technologies  that  demonstrate  how 
the  content-distribution  mechanisms  we  envision  are 
both feasible and practical.
Authentication
A fundamental issue in communicating threat informa-
tion is the degree to which a consumer of the informa-
tion  should  trust  what  is  communicated.  Establishing 
trust requires action on at least two levels: authentica-
tion of transmissions, and trust in their contents. Com-
munication  and  authentication  standards  for  data 
transmission are well understood in general. We expect 
that typical protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL;  tinyurl.com/c9jdg), or similar protocols that achieve 
efficient data transmission and encryption may be suffi-
cient.  Message  authentication  and  other  techniques 
may also be applied to authenticate threat data.
Enclave  peers  will  need  to  guard  against  malicious  or 
broken  peers,  which  may  correctly  implement  data-
transmission  policies  but  may  also  transmit  informa-
tion  counter  to  enclave  interests.  This  problem  is  the 
subject  of  ongoing  research  in  the  general  case,  but 
mechanisms based on reputation systems seem a likely 
solution to the problem (Resnick et al., 2000; tinyurl.com/
km43orc). In a reputation system, a node keeps track of 
reputation data from its peers. As an example, node A 
may keep track of threat information provided by each 
of its peers. If a threat reported by one peer, B, is correl-
ated  by  another  peer,  or  system-countermeasures  re-
port stating that the threat became reality, then A may 
increase its “opinion” of B. If a threat never materializes 
and no other peer mentions it, A may decrease its opin-
ion of B. Once generated, this reputation data can be 
used to quickly and easily weight threat information in-
troduced  to  a  node.  In  the  long  run,  such  reputation 
systems may also be used to remove peers that do not 
provide good, relevant data to the node and to find new 
peers that can provide such information.
Countermeasures
Enclaves offer a unique opportunity for dynamic adjust-
ment in defensive posture. The timely exchange of rel-
evant threat information allows hosts to take dynamic 
defensive action, and then revert to less aggressive de-
fensive postures when threats pass. In contrast, current 
network  defence  techniques  rely  on  static  defensive 
postures that may impose hardships on users and sys-
tem  administrators.  For  example,  countermeasures 
that automatically block network access (in part or in 
full),  restrict  account  privileges,  back  up  or  obscure 
sensitive data, or temporarily disable ports can disrupt 
business processes and reduce utilization of computing 
resources if used consistently. However, if deployed for 
short time periods surrounding an attack, such disrup-
tion can be minimized. 
Additional countermeasures may be available that are 
suitable  for  short-term,  dynamic  deployment,  but 
might  impose  too  much  disruption  for  static  deploy-
ment.  Through  recent  research  at  Galois,  Inc. 
(galois.com), we demonstrated the use of virtual-machine 
creation  on-the-fly  as  a  network  defence  technique 
called  CyberChaff.  Upon  detection  of  an  imminent 
threat, a CyberChaff device deploys a significant num-Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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ber  of  lightweight  virtual  machines  onto  a  network, 
with  network  configurations  that  can  be  tuned  to  ap-
pear as particular operating systems running standard 
sets of services. By doing so, CyberChaff has the poten-
tial to obfuscate the network structure in order to con-
fuse  attackers.  In  addition,  CyberChaff's  virtual 
machines  can  serve  as  honeypots  (tinyurl.com/37scmk), 
gathering information about patterns of cyberthreats to 
provide  greater  insight  into  the  attackers'  identities, 
goals, and preferred attack patterns. The Chaff Control-
ler, shown in Figure 1, illustrates how CyberChaff fits in-
to our notional enclave peer architecture. 
Other  recent  research  at  Galois  demonstrated  a  net-
work  stack  called  Ditto,  which  can  allow  a  host  to 
falsely  display  its  configuration  to  external  network 
scans. Using Ditto, a host can appear to be running a 
different  operating  system  than  actually  used  by  the 
host. Ditto is intended to solicit attackers to waste time 
by applying exploits that are less likely to succeed be-
cause  they  target  incorrect  operating  systems.  The 
Ditto Obscuration Controller, shown in Figure 1, illus-
trates how Ditto fits into our enclave peer.
There  is  increasing  interest  in  using  software-defined 
network  routing  such  as  that  provided  by  OpenFlow 
(openflow.org)  for  intrusion  response.  OpenFlow  allows 
hosts to specify policies that classify traffic as belonging 
to specific network flows and thus enables redirecting 
of that traffic upon detection. For example, OpenFlow 
policies might re-direct port scanning traffic from its in-
tended destination to a honeypot. The FRESCO frame-
work  (Shin  et  al.,  2013;  tinyurl.com/n2z24wv)  is  a  recent 
system  that  employs  a  related  approach.  Software-
defined  networking  might  be  included  as  part  of  the 
Programmable Network Adapter shown in Figure 1.
Conclusion
Current  approaches  to  network  defence  rely  on  static 
end-point defensive postures taken by individual hosts 
that lack timely and relevant information about threats 
they may soon face; or actions orchestrated by central-
ized command-and-control systems that receive threat 
information  and  adjust  postures  slowly  relative  to  at-
tacks. Our vision is to change this defensive landscape 
by enabling the creation of enclaves that are respons-
ive, informed, and armed. In such enclaves, each host 
dynamically adjusts its own defence at cyberspeed, and 
all hosts share information about emerging threats with 
their peers in a timely way. In doing so, hosts can re-
duce disruption to users and system administrators be-
cause some countermeasures can be deployed dynam-
ically in response to such information instead of static-
ally,  and  hosts  gain  the  advantage  of  access  to  new 
countermeasures specifically designed for such dynam-
ic  deployment.  Such  enclaves  may  be  localized  to  a 
single network or may include hosts from distinct net-
works owned by organizations that face common cyber-
threats.  For  example,  as  the  Internet  of  Things  (tinyurl
.com/5qr2nq)  emerges  and  home  networks  grow  to  be 
more  attractive  targets,  home  networks  in  a  physical 
neighbourhood  may  face  common  threats  such  as 
drive-by  network  hacking,  and  these  networks  may 
form enclaves in response. 
In this article, we presented a notional architecture for 
hosts capable of operating in the enclaves we describe, 
as well as a notional means for these hosts to commu-
nicate  timely,  relevant  threat  data.  For  the  most  part, 
the key technologies required to create a first genera-
tion of such enclaves already exist. However, some key 
technologies still require advancement, and the pieces 
must be combined into an integrated whole. We note, 
in particular, the need for practical, rapid methods for 
describing  and  communicating  threat  information,  as 
well as the need to develop advanced-decisions engines 
capable of receiving, analyzing, and acting on network 
threats.Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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